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The Tensions Between Regulation of the
Legal Profession and Protection of the First
Amendment Rights of Lawyers and Judges:
A Tribute to Ronald Rotunda
Rodney A. Smolla
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is dedicated to the memory of my departed
friend and colleague Ron Rotunda. When I later transition to
substantive legal analysis, I will use the respectfully professional
appellation “Professor Rotunda.” In this personal opening
reflection, however, he will just be Ron.
Early on in my career as a law professor, I was on the faculty
with Ron at the University of Illinois College of Law. Ron and his
close friend and life-long co-author, John Nowak, were my friends
and my mentors. Ron was a Renaissance Man, with wide-ranging
intellectual and cultural interests. I will never forget dinners at
his home, where I learned as much about fine wine and food,
international travel, and outer-space as I did about legal ethics
and constitutional law. I have seared in my mind’s eye viewing
planets through the high-powered telescope Ron had mounted in
his backyard, unveiling his passion as a dedicated astronomer.
Ron taught me to see the stars and to reach for them.
In this Article, I reflect on the intersection of Ron’s two
greatest scholarly passions: legal ethics and constitutional law.
More specifically, I focus on the tensions that Ron explored
between the regulation of the legal profession and the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In 1995, Ron wrote an
article entitled Racist Speech and Lawyer Discipline.1 In the
article, Ron argued against the adoption of a proposal to change
Rule 8.4 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The proposed change would “make a
lawyer subject to discipline for engaging in speech that indicates
racial, or sexual, or other bias.”2 Ron argued passionately that
the proposed change would be an affront to the free speech values

1
2

Dean and Professor of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School.
Ronald D. Rotunda, Racist Speech and Lawyer Discipline, 6 PROF. LAW. 1, 1 (1995).
Id.
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of the First Amendment.3
Twenty-one years later, in August of 2016, the ABA adopted
a new section 8.4(g) to the Model Rules, which provides that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the
practice of law.”4
In the summer of 2018, the United States Supreme Court
decided National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra
(NIFLA).5 In NIFLA, the Court struck down provisions of a
California law requiring that pro-life pregnancy centers counsel
clients on the availability of abortion services.6 On the surface, the
Supreme Court’s NIFLA pregnancy counseling decision and ABA
Model Rule 8.4(g) might seem unrelated, but they are linked.
California attempted to defend its abortion counseling law as a valid
regulation of “professional speech.”7 To the extent that ABA Model
Rule 8.4(g) applies to the speech of lawyers, its proponents might
proffer the same defense. Rule 8.4(g), it may be claimed, regulates
only professional conduct. To the extent that the regulation of the
professional conduct of lawyers incidentally implicates a lawyer’s
speech, the argument continues that regulation of “professional
speech” should have little, if any, First Amendment protection.
My friend Ron—Professor Rotunda—would never have
countenanced this argument. In this personal tribute to Ron, I
offer my thoughts on why I think the great Professor Rotunda was
right. By the same token, Rule 8.4(g), as it was finally passed, was
by no means a brazen effort to restrict politically incorrect speech.
On its face, it targets only conduct, and even then, only conduct
that would constitute “harassment” or “discrimination” to boot.8
Professor Rotunda’s early attacks at more sweeping proposals may
actually have accomplished their purpose by narrowing the
compass of what the ABA finally enacted. In this Article, I explore
these conundrums in honor of my friend and colleague’s memory,
and his towering contributions to the legal profession and the
ongoing interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.

3
4
5
6
7
8

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (A M. BAR ASS’N 2016).
See generally 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
Id. at 2370.
Id. at 2371.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (A M. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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II. ABA MODEL RULE 8.4(G)
The text of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), as passed by the ABA
House of Delegates in August of 2016, was the product of an
evolutionary process that began in the mid-1990s when Professor
Rotunda first voiced his opposition. The original proposals were
advances on what was once Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4(d).
That former Comment 3 read:
A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status,
violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing
factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge’s finding that
peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not
alone establish a violation of this rule.9

This Comment plainly encompassed expression, as it openly
referred to “words or conduct.”10 It was tempered, however, by the
requirement that the actions be “prejudicial to the administration
of justice.”11
The provision that would become Rule 8.4(g), when adopted
at the 2016 annual meeting in San Francisco, began to gain
traction in 2014 through what was known as “Resolution 109.”12
The resolution went through numerous revisions and iterations
before the version ultimately enacted was passed. That version
provides in its entirety that it is misconduct for a lawyer to:
engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to
the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a
lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in
accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude
legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.13

The intended scope of Rule 8.4(g) is slightly amplified by
Comment 4, which provides some additional definition to the
phrase “conduct related to the practice of law,” by reciting:
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients;
interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (A M. BAR ASS’N 1992).
Id.
Id.
12 Annual Meeting 2016: ABA amends Model Rules to add anti-discrimination,
anti-harassment provision, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/
abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/08/annual_meeting_20161/ [http://perma.cc/YMU3-YYYT].
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (A M. BAR ASS’N 2016).
9
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others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a
law firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business
or social activities in connection with the practice of law. Lawyers may
engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion
without violating this Rule by, for example, implementing initiatives
aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees
or sponsoring diverse law student organizations.14

Taken in combination, the text of Rule 8.4(g) and the
accompanying Comment 4 present some ambiguity as to whether
the Rule regulates the speech of lawyers. Rule 8.4(g) is phrased as
only engaging in “conduct” that is “related to the practice of law”
which would constitute “harassment or discrimination.”15 The text
of the Rule assiduously avoids reference to speech. Unlike old
Comment 3, it avoids use of the phrase “manifests by words.”
Yet, the practice of law is almost entirely accomplished
through the use of language. Doctors operate on the human body
probing the organs, performing surgeries, and prescribing
medications. Doctors also use speech to counsel and communicate
to patients. The practice of medicine, however, is at least in equal
parts physical and expressive. The practice of law, however, is
almost entirely expressive. To regulate the “conduct” of lawyers is
almost entirely to regulate what lawyers say. There are, of course,
non-expressive aspects to the regulation of professional conduct.
Rules relating to conflicts of interest, for example, concern
transactions and relationships more than speech—though even
those rules often implicate expression, as when they implicate
obligations of disclosure or confidentiality.16
Even so, a large part of law practice is expressive, and a
large part of the rules governing professional responsibility
inevitably involve expression. Thus, “conduct” related to the
practice of law that would amount to harassment or
discrimination still could easily encompass expressive activity
arguably falling within the protective ambit of the First
Amendment. Comment 4 plainly suggests that this is so by
describing the “conduct” prohibited as extending to “participating
in bar association, business or social activities in connection with
the practice of law.”17 Rule 8.4(g)’s potential tensions with the First
Amendment are further intensified by the curious final sentence to
Comment 4, which has troubling colorations of viewpoint
discrimination. Lawyers are expressly allowed to “promote diversity
and inclusion” by, for example, “implementing initiatives aimed at
14
15
16
17

Id. at cmt. 4.
Id.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4 (A M. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or
sponsoring diverse law student organizations.”18 This safe-harbor
for what lawyers can do plainly envisions expressive activity that
promotes progressive pro-diversity provisions, suggesting that what
lawyers cannot do is engage in similarly expressive activity
promoting an anti-inclusive or anti-diversity end.
III. PROFESSOR ROTUNDA’S CRITIQUE
Professor Rotunda’s attack on the insipient emerging proposals
to modify Rule 8.4 that surfaced in the 1990s assumed that the
proposals were intended to curb the expression of lawyers as
lawyers in a manner that would not be permitted under the First
Amendment for non-lawyers. This led Professor Rotunda to frame
his analysis by asking what additional purchase on the regulation
of speech was gained by governmental authorities engaged in the
conduct of regulating the legal profession.19 From this starting
point, he divined a critical divide separating those rules of
professional responsibility that are functionally related to the
practice of law and those that are not:
The anti-speech proposals before the ABA are bad policy for another
reason. For many years the ABA has fought to limit discipline of
lawyers to matters that are functionally related to the practice of law.
There are a lot of things that are bad (or that large segments of our
population think are bad) but that do not preclude one from practicing
law. Rule 8.4(b) does not provide that it is professional misconduct to
engage in any “criminal act”; rather, it is only misconduct to engage in
a criminal act “that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”
In the old days, many states were disciplining lawyers for adultery or
fornication. While most people do not approve of adultery, that does not
mean that one should discipline a lawyer for engaging in it. The official
Comment to Rule 8.4 states that offenses “of personal morality, such as
adultery and comparable offenses” do not relate to the fitness to practice
law. “Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal
law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that
indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.”20

In a manner characteristic of his qualities as a Renaissance
Man, Professor Rotunda concluded his attack on the nascent
version of Rule 8.4(g) by invoking classical conceptions of freedom
of speech.21 Professor Rotunda observed that “[i]n ancient Athens,
the cradle of democracy, the Greeks widely believed that their

18
19
20
21

Id.
See Rotunda, supra note 1.
Id. at 4 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 6.
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freedom of speech made their armies more brave.”22 Professor
Rotunda invoked the history of Herodotus, who boasted that the
Athenians could win victories over the more numerous Persians
because the Athenians fought not as slaves but as free people
respecting free speech.23 So too, in his play The Persian, Aeschylus
touted the victory of the Greeks because: “Of no man are they the
slaves or subjects.”24 Quoting I.F. Stone, Professor Rotunda
concluded: “For Aeschylus, and for the Athenians, it was not just a
victory of Greeks over Persians but of free men over ‘slaves.’ The
victors at Salamis were men elevated and inspired by the freedom
to speak their minds and govern themselves.”25 Admonishing the
ABA to not forget these ancient truths, Professor Rotunda urged
the ABA to resist, even in a spirit of compromise, lending “any
support to those who would discipline lawyers (or anyone else) for
what they say or think, even when we know that what they say or
think is abhorrent and offensive.”26
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROFESSIONAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The “professional speech doctrine” developed momentum
through a series of decisions by various federal circuits from 2013
through 2016. The courts posited that the regulation of the
speech of professionals, incident to the regulation of a profession
should be analyzed under some level of reduced First
Amendment scrutiny.27 In Pickup v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit
invoked the professional speech doctrine to uphold a California
law forbidding such sexual orientation change efforts for minors,
applying simple rational basis review.28 The same year, the Third
Circuit invoked the professional speech doctrine to uphold a
similar law in King v. Governor of New Jersey.29 Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit invoked the professional speech doctrine to
sustain regulation of the speech of fortune tellers in Moore-King
v. County of Chesterfield.30
The incipient professional speech doctrine drew significant
commentary and mixed reviews.31 I was an opponent of the
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 2 AESCHYLUS , P LAYS (H. Weir Smyth, trans., 1922)).
25 Id. (quoting I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 51 (1988)).
26 Id.
27 See generally David L. Hudson Jr., The Professional Speech Doctrine , F IRST
AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1551/professionalspeech-doctrine [http://perma.cc/z82E-LNGR].
28 See 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014).
29 See 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014).
30 708 F.3d 560, 569–70 (4th Cir. 2013).
31 See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and
Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681 (2016); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125
22
23
24
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recognition of the professional speech doctrine. My critique of the
doctrine sounded themes parallel to those invoked by Professor
Rotunda in his early admonitions against the initial proposals to
enact changes to Rule 8.4. Modern First Amendment doctrine is
rooted in faith in the marketplace. 32 Overreaching by
government, not overreaching by lawyers, doctors, or fortune
tellers, is the primary concern of the First Amendment. 33 Instead
of inventing a special level of reduced scrutiny for the regulation
of speech by professionals, I argued courts should engage in the
rigorous strict scrutiny test in analyzing content-based
regulation of professional speech. 34 Application of strict scrutiny
will sort the chaff from the wheat, resulting in the striking down
of paternalistic regulations that deserve to be struck down, and
the upholding of regulations that deserve to be upheld.
Somewhat to my surprise, the Supreme Court of the United
States effectively killed the professional speech doctrine earlier
and more emphatically than I ever might have imagined. The
professional speech doctrine crashed and burned in NIFLA.35
NIFLA posed a challenge to the California Reproductive Freedom,
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the
“FACT Act”).36 The California law was enacted to regulate crisis
pregnancy centers—pro-life centers that offer pregnancy-related
services.37 The FACT Act required licensed clinics that primarily
serve pregnant women to advise those women that California
provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give
them a phone number to call.38 The FACT Act’s stated purpose
was to make sure that state residents know their rights and what
healthcare services are available to them. 39 Unlicensed clinics
must notify women that California had not licensed the clinics to
provide medical services, to ensure that pregnant women know
when they are receiving healthcare from licensed professionals.40
In striking down the California provisions, the Court
observed that the “Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’

YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016); Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change
Efforts: The California Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J.
1532, 1537 (2014).
32 Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L.
REV. 67, 112 (2016).
33 Id.
34 See id.
35 See generally 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
36 Id. at 2368; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (West 2018).
37 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2369.
40 Id. at 2370.
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as a separate category of speech.”41 The Court distinguished two
areas of existing First Amendment law in which it had previously
recognized that standards lower than strict scrutiny applied to
the speech of professionals was appropriate.42
The intermediate scrutiny “commercial speech” standard
applied to the commercial speech of professionals, such as
advertising.43 The commercial speech standard was limited,
however, to requiring disclosure, at times, of factual
noncontroversial information: “First, our precedents have applied
more deferential review to some laws that require professionals to
disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial
speech.’”44 But rules governing disclosure in commercial speech
contexts, under the leading lawyer advertising commercial speech
decision involving disclosures, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,45 the Court held, were not
applicable to the sort of disclosures California sought to impose on
the clinics under the guise of the professional speech doctrine.46 The
speech California sought to force the clinics to speak had nothing to
do with the clinics’ services or products, but were entirely the
state-sponsored message of California.47
The Court in NIFLA also rejected the argument that the
California provisions could be upheld as regulation of
professional conduct that “incidentally involves speech,” of the
sort approved in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.48 Professional
ethical standards, or suits for professional malpractice, for
example, have traditionally been regarded as regulating professional
conduct, though that conduct may involve speaking.49 “While
drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this
Court’s precedents have long drawn it.”50
“Outside of the two contexts discussed above—disclosures
Id. at 2371.
Id. at 2372.
43 Id.
44 Id. (first citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); then citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); and then citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
45 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
46 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
47 See id. (“The Zauderer standard does not apply here. Most obviously, the licensed
notice is not limited to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under
which . . . services will be available.’ The notice in no way relates to the services that licensed
clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored
services—including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zauderer
has no application here.” (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)).
48 Id.
49 See id. at 2373.
50 Id.
41
42
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under Zauderer and professional conduct—this Court’s precedents
have long protected the First Amendment rights of professionals,”
the Court observed.51 For example, the Court “has applied strict
scrutiny to content-based laws that regulate the noncommercial
speech of lawyers, professional fundraisers, and organizations that
provided specialized advice about international law.”52
The Court had sound reasons for driving a stake through the
heart of the professional speech doctrine. “The dangers associated with
content-based regulations of speech are also present in the context of
professional speech.”53 As with other kinds of speech, the Court
reasoned, regulating the content of professionals’ speech poses the
inherent risk that the government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information.54
Indeed, throughout history, governments have manipulated the speech
of professionals “to increase state power and suppress minorities.”55
This skews the operation of the marketplace of ideas:
Professionals might have a host of good-faith disagreements, both
with each other and with the government, on many topics in their
respective fields. Doctors and nurses might disagree about the ethics
of assisted suicide or the benefits of medical marijuana; lawyers and
marriage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial
agreements or the wisdom of divorce; bankers and accountants might
disagree about the amount of money that should be devoted to savings
or the benefits of tax reform.56

The Court noted that, among other things, the reach of the
professional speech doctrine was almost limitless, given the
difficulty of defining what would or would not qualify as

Id. at 2374.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. For example:
[D]uring the Cultural Revolution, Chinese physicians were dispatched to the
countryside to convince peasants to use contraception. In the 1930s, the Soviet
government expedited completion of a construction project on the Siberian
railroad by ordering doctors to both reject requests for medical leave from work
and conceal this government order from their patients. In Nazi Germany, the
Third Reich systematically violated the separation between state ideology and
medical discourse. German physicians were taught that they owed a higher
duty to the “health of the Volk” than to the health of individual patients.
Recently, Nicolae Ceausescu’s strategy to increase the Romanian birth rate
included prohibitions against giving advice to patients about the use of birth
control devices and disseminating information about the use of condoms as a
means of preventing the transmission of AIDS.
Id. (quoting Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse
and the Right To Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 201–02 (1994)
(footnotes omitted)).
56 Id. at 2374–75.
51
52
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“professional.”57 Indeed, the professional speech doctrine had the
capacity to turn fundamental First Amendment assumptions
upside down. For carried to its logical end, all the government
would be required to do is create licensure rules for any
particular occupation and then seek to reduce the freedom of
members of that occupation to speak by treating the regulation
as mere regulation of professional speech. 58 States do not get to
choose the level of scrutiny a regulation will receive under the
First Amendment; it is the First Amendment that chooses the
level of scrutiny applied to a regulation by the States.59
The Court in NIFLA did not foreclose the slim possibility
that in some future scenario there might be a case for reduced
scrutiny of the regulation of professionals:
In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a
persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category
that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not
foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists. We need not do so
because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.
California asserts a single interest to justify the licensed notice: providing
low-income women with information about state-sponsored services.
Assuming that this is a substantial state interest, the licensed notice is
not sufficiently drawn to achieve it.60

This modest hedge, however, was nothing more, in my view, than
recognition that there undoubtedly are situations, as Professor
Rotunda’s article acknowledged, 61 when palpable government
interests related to the functional health of the administration of
justice and the conduct of lawyers will not run afoul of the First
Amendment. In the closing section of this Article, I elaborate on
what I believe Professor Rotunda had in mind, and what the
Supreme Court in NIFLA had in mind, and how those minds are
well-met, forming a coherent theory of what sorts of regulation of
the speech of lawyers the Constitution does and does not permit.

Id. (citing Smolla, supra note 32).
Id. at 2375 (“All that is required to make something a ‘profession,’ according to
these courts, is that it involves personalized services and requires a professional license
from the State. But that gives the States unfettered power to reduce a group’s First
Amendment rights by simply imposing a licensing requirement.”).
59 Id. (“States cannot choose the protection that speech receives under the First
Amendment, as that would give them a powerful tool to impose ‘invidious discrimination
of disfavored subjects.’” (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
423–24, n.19 (1993))); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
796 (1988) (“[S]tate labels cannot be dispositive of [the] degree of First Amendment
protection.” (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975))).
60 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
61 See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 1, at 6.
57
58
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V. EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
If the power of government to regulate the speech of lawyers
and judges is considered on a spectrum, the government’s power
will surely be at its apex when the regulation is directly connected
to the management of the administration of justice. Speech by
lawyers and judges inside a courtroom is the quintessential
example. In Sacher v. United States, the Supreme Court sustained
the power of courts to use their contempt authority to sanction a
lawyer for his expression within a courtroom.62 The Court invoked
solid, functional rationales for its ruling, noting that “[t]he nature
of the [lawyer’s] deportment was not such as merely to offend
personal sensitivities of the judge, but it prejudiced the
expeditious, orderly and dispassionate conduct of the trial.”63
When a lawyer speaks outside a courtroom on a matter
pending inside a courtroom, the constitutional protection for the
speech remains high, though the government is permitted,
under the rule of Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,64 to limit the
extrajudicial speech of a lawyer participating in an ongoing
proceeding when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the speech will “hav[e] a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing that [adjudicative] proceeding.”65
At the opposite end of the spectrum are efforts by the
government to use the leverage of licensing attorneys to exact
requirements that attorneys not take disfavored positions on
public issues not directly germane to the practice law. The First
Amendment would surely be violated by a sweeping regulation
prohibiting an attorney from engaging in racist speech, or joining
a racist organization, in situations in which the speech or the
membership bear no connection to the practice of law.
As reprehensible as racist speech and membership in
racist organizations were to Professor Rotunda—and are to
343 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1952).
Id. at 5.
64 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
65 Id. at 1076. (“The regulation of attorneys’ speech is limited—it applies only to
speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to
points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it
merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the trial.”). While this rule comes
from the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, on this issue the Chief Justice
spoke for the Court. Id. at 1032, 1076. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of
the Court joined by Justices White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter, upholding the general
“substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard. Id. at 1032, 1063 (“We conclude
that the ‘substantial likelihood of material prejudice’ standard applied by Nevada and
most other States satisfies the First Amendment.”). The Court nonetheless struck down
Nevada’s unusual interpretation and application of the rule, holding it was
unconstitutionally vague, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor. Id. at 1048.
62
63

Do Not Delete

296

5/29/2019 2:34 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 22:2

me—Americans, including lawyers, have a right to be racist
and associate with other racists. Professor Rotunda’s position
was crystalline in its clarity:
First, let me make clear that I do not support lawyers who engage in
racial or sexual discrimination. Nor do I think that lawyers should tell
racist, ethnic, sexist, or other similar jokes. We should not laugh at
such jokes, or otherwise indicate support of such speech. We can
indicate, by our speech, that we do not approve of such discriminatory
speech. The best weapon against the speech we do not like is more
speech, not enforced silence.
It is one thing for us to disapprove of such speech, and it is another
matter if we seek to use the authority of the state to punish such
speech. The latter violates the First Amendment.66

For my part, I served as lead counsel, writing the briefs and
presenting argument in the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black,67
in which my clients included a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, a
dedicated white supremacist, who had led a cross-burning ceremony
as part of a traditional Klan ritual. 68 I was able to draw a
distinction between my revulsion for his beliefs and my own belief
in the First Amendment.
Where on the spectrum does the new ABA Model Rule
8.4(g) fall? Consider, as part of the mix, a somewhat parallel
provision in Rule 2.3(B) of the American Bar Association Model
Code of Judicial Conduct:
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment,
including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon
race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political
affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others
subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.69

Rule 2.3(B) is in some respects ostensibly broader than Rule
8.4(g). Rule 2.3(B) prohibits “words or conduct,”70 whereas Rule 8.4(g)
requires that the lawyer “engage in conduct.”71 Rule 2.3(B) reaches
“words” that “manifest bias or prejudice.”72 Thus, for a judge to
express himself or herself in words that manifest prejudice is
prohibited. In contrast, Rule 8.4(g) requires that the conduct
prohibited “is harassment or discrimination.”73 On the other hand,
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Rotunda, supra note 1, at 1.
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
Id. at 347.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
See id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (A M. BAR ASS’N 2016).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (A M. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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in one respect, Rule 2.3(B) is arguably more tightly confined than
Rule 8.4(g). Rule 2.3(B) is limited to what a judge does “in the
performance of judicial duties.”74 Rule 8.4(g) refers to “conduct
related to the practice of law,” a concept that might be deemed more
expansive than actual performance of the practice of law. Comment
4, as previously noted, suggests the potentially expansive reach of
the prohibition, describing it as reaching actions by lawyers
“participating in bar association, business or social activities in
connection with the practice of law.”75
A narrow reading of Rule 8.4(g) would limit its reach to
conduct in the practice of law constituting “harassment” or
“discrimination” of the sort that would be illegal and unprotected
by the Constitution, under federal, state, and local civil rights
laws. If that is all that Rule 8.4(g) prohibits, then the hubbub
over it is much ado about nothing. But it is not at all plain that
Rule 8.4(g) is so limited. The scholarly commentary on the issue
is divided.76 A particularly thoughtful and balanced exploration
of the issues by Professor Rebecca Aviel canvasses the history,
text, and commentary of the Rule, yet concludes somewhat
inconclusively, describing sensibilities about the Rule as a
cultural work-in-progress. 77 Professor Aviel argues that “Rule
8.4(g) is a project to reshape the norms of the legal profession so
that discrimination and harassment come to be seen as similarly
grievous as misrepresentation and dishonesty.”78 Professor Aviel
admits this is an ambitious project, but ends with the optimistic
exhortation that “with a bit more work we can make sure it is not
an unconstitutional one.”79
Individual states, of course, must make their own choices as to
whether to adopt language suggested by ABA Model Rule
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (A M. BAR ASS’N 2016).
76 See Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A
Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 216
(2017) (“The claim that ‘harassment’ is unfairly vague, perhaps fatally so, ignores some
powerful contrary arguments.”); Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts
Considering Model Rule 8.4(g) the First Amendment and “Conduct Related to the Practice
of Law”, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 257 (2017) (“Because no jurisdiction has ever
attempted to enforce a speech code over social activities merely ‘connected with the
practice of law,’ there are no precedents to turn to in order to assess such a regime's
constitutionality. (Professor Gillers fails to acknowledge this gap in his otherwise
thorough analysis.) While discrimination and sexual harassment do have established
bodies of case law that can be referred to, longstanding ethics rules do not penalize
harassment by itself in the context of private speech at various social functions. In such
fora, the government’s interest is at its nadir, and tailoring must be extremely narrow to
survive judicial scrutiny.” (footnote omitted)).
77 See Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between
Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 55 (2018).
78 Id. at 76.
79 Id.
74
75
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8.4(g), and if so, whether to modify the Rule to bring it more clearly
into conformity with First Amendment norms. There are numerous
steps that can be taken to tighten the scope of the Rule, and in so
tightening, reduce tensions with the First Amendment.
One step is to include limiting language that would clarify
that only conduct, including conduct effectuated through the use of
language, that would constitute harassment or discrimination as
defined under such civil rights laws as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 are prohibited by the Rule. The leading Supreme
Court case defining the contours of hostile work environment
claims under Title VII should be understood as also establishing
the permissible limitations on what constitutes “harassment” for
the purpose of the regulation of the conduct of lawyers. In Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,80 the Court explained:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title
VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII
violation. But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work
environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or
keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without
regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory
conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment
abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.81

The Supreme Court has never taken a deep dive into an
explanation of exactly why expression that would be protected by
the First Amendment in the general marketplace might
nonetheless be proscribable in the workplace. There are, however,
cogent justifications.
First, speech that might be dismissed as constitutionally
protected hate speech in the general marketplace takes on a
different pallor within the workplace environment. An employee
who sues under Title VII and recovers is clearly not engaged in an
attempt to recover for mere distress caused by the content of a
speaker’s message. The employee, instead, is invoking a legal
remedy for abridgment of a legally vested interest: The interest
Title VII grants all employees in freedom from discrimination in the
80
81

510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 21–22.
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workplace. More than mere offense in reaction to the message is in
play. There is a more palpable disruption of a legal relationship
protected by law: The relationship of an employee to an employer
that is guaranteed to be free from prohibited discrimination.
Second, there are captive audience and coercion elements
implicated in the workplace. The classic response to exposure to
offensive speech in the general marketplace is that the offended
viewer should look the other way.82 “The plain, if at times
disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society, constantly
proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, ‘we are
inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.’”83 Now more
than ever, we are constantly bombarded with speech that we deem
false, coarse, and offensive. Would that it was not so, but this is
the world we live in. “Much that we encounter offends our esthetic,
if not our political and moral, sensibilities.”84 It comes down
largely to an issue of who “decide[s].”85 Modern First Amendment
orthodoxy, which Professor Rotunda deeply embraced, is that the
“who” ought not be the government. In this deep belief, I believe
he was right. He was surely right in the estimation of the Supreme
Court, because the Court proclaimed, “the Constitution does not
permit [the] government to decide which types of otherwise
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer.”86 Yes, we are all subjected, all of
the time, to messages that offend us. But the constitutional
presumption is that, as adults, we avoid what bothers us by
looking away, or dealing with it and responding.87
A second step is to abandon efforts to regulate the conduct of
lawyers with regard to biased speech in bar association, business,
or social activities related to the practice of law. In these settings,
there is great danger that bar authorities, wielding the force of
the state, would be invited to investigate and potentially punish
boorish, unsavory, and offensive comments that would turn off
many, if not most, lawyers of goodwill and restrained judgment
said in intemperate moments at a conference or a cocktail party.
Our profession has plenty of informal social, cultural, and
peer-pressure levers to exert as a counter to such expression. To
render such expression grounds for professional discipline,
however, comes dangerously close to imposing a culture of
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975).
Id. at 210 (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 210–11 (“Rather, . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid
further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.’” (quoting Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
82
83
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orthodoxy and decorum that may align with the highest
aspirations of the profession, but cannot be squared with the
values of free speech in an open society. As I have argued
elsewhere, much of modern First Amendment law is most easily
understood as an exercise in boundary disputes. In the general
marketplace, we extend robust protection to even the most
offensive opinions. Unless the speech meets the rigorous First
Amendment standards defining incitement to violence, a true
threat, or defamation, to use common examples, the Constitution
protects it. In certain “carve outs” from the general marketplace,
such as the workplace, speech that would be protected in the
general marketplace may become proscribable. The standard in
Harris defining hostile work environments, for example, would
render actionable under Title VII language that which could not
be penalized off-duty in a public park. 88 The looseness of current
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), particularly as expanded by Comment 4,
seems to disregard this fundamental constitutional divide.
VI. CONCLUSION
My friend Ron Rotunda was a scholar, teacher, and advocate
driven by deep conviction and powerful passions. Perhaps that is
why he was so solicitous of freedom of speech, and so cautious about
equating attitudes and sentiments he deemed unsavory as
punishable violations of legally binding ethical rules. I am thankful
to the Chapman Law Review for the opportunity to offer this brief
reflection on the personality and principles of Ron Rotunda, whose
passions and thoughts made this world a better place.

88

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

